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Bingham: Bingham: Reflections on Designing Governance

Reflections on Designing Governance
to Produce the Rule of Law
Lisa Blomgren Bingham*
This symposium examines the relationship between the field of dispute resolution and the rule of law. This article explores these connections through two
complementary lenses: dispute systems design and collaborative governance. It
posits as a working hypothesis that it is possible to design governance as a necessary condition to produce the rule of law by using institutional and dispute systems design (DSD) across the policy continuum. It also argues that many rule of
law interventions necessarily entail collaborative governance, which, broadly
conceived, includes deliberative democracy, collaborative public management,
and dispute resolution. Thoughtful design can coordinate collaborative and participatory programs across the policy continuum in ways that allow the branches of
government (legislative, executive, and judicial powers) to reinforce each other
synergistically. This article is only a first, preliminary effort to explore these connections. With that limitation, I conclude that systematically designing governance is a promising approach to help international actors achieve their goal, the
rule of law.
This article first briefly reviews definitions of the rule of law. Second, it
briefly reviews current understandings and approaches to governance. Third, it
introduces the concept of dispute systems design, its application to collaborative
governance across the policy continuum, and failures in the rule of law as seen
through this frame. Finally, it provides examples of rule of law initiatives organized across the policy process in governance.
I. DEFINING THE RULE OF LAW
The phrase 'rule of law' has many uses and is associated with a variety of criteria. In current legal scholarship, it appears in connection with a debate that takes
us back to the ancient Greeks: should law come from the sovereign or should law
be the sovereign? Associate Justice Antonin Scalia recently argued that the rule
of law should be a law of rules.' This debate weighs the value of democratically
adopted general rules against the importance of judicial discretion to do justice
and create law ad hoc.2 This debate also generally considers the rule of law

* Lisa Blomgren Bingham is the Keller-Runden Prof. of Public Service at the Ind. Univ. School of
Public and Environmental Affairs, Bloomington, Ind. and Visiting Prof. of Law at the Boyd School of
Law, Univ. of Ney., Las Vegas. I am grateful for research assistance from David McClure and Jennifcr Gross, Reference Librarians at the Boyd School of Law. I also wish to thank Prof. Richard Reuben,
Stephanie Smith, and Janet K. Martinez for many useful conversations on this important subject.
1. Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law ofRules, 56 CHIc. L. Rev. 1175 (1989).
2. Id. at 1176.
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through its ends, such as law and order, a government bound by law, and human
rights.'
However, in the international arena, the phrase "rule of law" has taken on a
variety of other meanings focused more on the means to these ends.4 For example, one scholar argued that international rule of law initiatives seek to create "the
proper institutional attributes-the 'necessar ' laws, a 'well-functioning' judiciary,
and a 'good' law enforcement apparatus," which she alternatively characterized
as "an efficient and trained judiciary, a non-corrupt police force, and published,
publicly known laws."6 The United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) combines means and ends by seeking five elements: order and security,
legitimacy, checks and balances, fairness, and effective application.
One might also organize these 'means and ends' differently; one could characterize them as either procedural or substantive. 8 I use the terms procedural and
3. Rachel Kleinfeld, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law, in THOMAS CAROTHERS,
PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE, 33-34 (2006).

4. For a description of evolving conceptions of the rule of law in development efforts, see David
M. Trubek, The "Rule of Law" in Development Assistance: Past, Present, and Future, in THE NEW
LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 74 (DAVID M. TRUBEK AND ALVARO
SANTOS, EDS., 2006).
5. Kicinfeld, supranote 3, at 33.
6. Id at 34.
7. For example, the following excerpt from its Users Guide to DG Programming,45 (2010), available at http://www.usaid.gov/ourwork/dcmocracyand govemance/publications/pdfs/DGUserGuide
Novemberl0.pdf (last accessed Mar. 6, 2011) includes both means and ends in efforts to strengthen
five elements comprising the rule of law:
Order and security: Establishing, rebuilding or expanding justice institutions; crime prevention,
community security and civilian policing; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
process; and witness and court personnel protection programs.
Legitimacy: Constitutional drafting processes; legal reform commissions and citizen mobilization; harmonization of non-state customary or religious law with state-based law; and transitional
justice mechanisms to address past abuses.
Checks and Balances: Establishing or strengthening independent judicial bodies; upgrading or
reforming judicial career processes; improving working conditions for judicial personnel; strengthening judicial administration, management and self-governance; strengthening independent
judicial and legal professional associations; enhancing judicial professional development and
access to the laws; and stimulating citizen support for judicial independence.
Fairness: Reforming and implementing procedural codes; reforming administrative law; improving transparent and efficient administration of justice system components; expanding access to
legal services; improving the quality of private defense; improving the accessibility of the state
justice system; supporting or expanding alternative dispute resolution; increasing citizen awareness of human rights standards and issues; strengthening human rights institutions; and working
with non-state justice institutions to improve access to justice.
Effective Application: Improving investigative capacity of police and/or prosecutors; enforcing
judgments; and strengthening the implementation of administrative law and procedure.
8. Thomas Carothers, Rule of Law Temptations, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RULE OF LAW,
17, 20-21 (JAMES J. HECKMAN, ROBERT L. NELSON, AND LEE CABATINGAN, EDS., 2010), observed:
Early on, some rule-of-law aid actors, particularly those who came to their work primarily out of
a concern for economic development, inclined toward a relatively formalist or proceduralist conception of the rule of law. Such a conception stresses procedural fairness and institutional inefficiency. It lcans in the direction of rule by law as much as rule of law. Over these two decades,
however, supporters of a broader conception of the rule of law gained ground in international devclopment circles. This broader conception holds that the rule of law is about substantive outcomes, not just procedural norms. It views basic political and civil rights as essential to ensuring
justice and an integral part of the rule of law.
Id.
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substantive similarly to the distinction between procedural and substantive due
process of law in U.S. constitutional law. For example, depending upon the context, procedural due process may include some or all of the protections the U.S.
Supreme Court articulated in Goldberg v. Kelly: timely and adequate notice, presenting evidence orally, confronting adverse witnesses, cross-examining adverse
witnesses, having government disclose opposing evidence, access to legal counsel,
presenting oral arguments, an impartial decision-maker who decides the case on
the hearing record, and a decision that states the reasons and the evidence.9 In
contrast, substantive due process entails defining the terms life, liberty, and property as those words are used in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The U.S.
Supreme Court constructed a rationale for a substantive right to privacy by reference to rights to free speech, freedom of association, freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures, and freedom from self-incrimination under the First,
Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.' 0 Procedures have to do with how government
takes action; substance has to do with what action it takes.
Procedural approaches to the rule of law include making government accountable through the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers," as did
the drafters of the U.S. Constitution.12 Similarly, transparency is a procedural
choice. Freedom of information laws, public records, and open access to government meetings all provide the public a process to view government in action;' 3
sunshine is the great sanitizer of corruption. Participatory democracy, which entails collaboration and voice in governance, represents a procedure both for transparency and for enhancing the information available to government decisionmakers.14 Better information enhances the quality of decisions.' 5 In theory, separation of powers is a procedure that creates an independent judiciary, one free
from corruption in the form of control by the executive branch. Arguably, it is
also procedural to provide a judiciary that is efficient and effective.
In contrast to these procedural choices for achieving the rule of law, there are
also underlying substantive ones that involve fundamental values.' 6 Protection of
human and civil rights,' 7 and protection of property from expropriation are substantive measures of the rule of law.' 8 Others argue that the rule of law entails a

9. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,267-270 (1970).
10. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 passim (1965).
I1. Kenneth W. Dam, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 4 (2006).
12. See generally THE FEDERALIST, http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa00.htm (last accessed
Mar. 6, 2011).
13. Lisa Blomgren Bingham, The Next Generation ofAdministrative Law: Building the Legal Infrastructure for Collaborative Governance. 2010 WIs. L. REV. 297,308 (2010).
14. See generally id.
15. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Transparency and Open Government: Memorandum for the
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 26, 2009).
16. Daniel B. Rodriguez, Mathew D. McCubbins, & Barry R. Weingast, The Rule of Law Unplugged, 59 EMORY L.J. 1455, 1469 (2010).
17. Carothers, supra notc 8; Terence C. Halliday, The Fight for Basic Legal Freedoms: Mobilization
by the Legal Complex, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RULE OF LAW 210 (JAMES J. HECKMAN,
ROBERT L. NELSON, AND LEE CABATINGAN, EDS., 2010).
18. KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAw-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 15 (2006).
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baseline of physical security 9 and satisfaction of basic needs for food, water,
shelter, and health care. 20 Substantive measures provide litigants with fairness,
equal justice under the law analogous to aspects of equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and access to justice for the poor.
All of these choices, whether substantive or procedural, represent possible
structural components that dispute systems designers can use in a comprehensive
design of governance.
II. THE RELATION OF GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNANCE TO THE RULE OF
LAW
Often, the underlying premise of international initiatives is that good governance can help produce the rule of law. The World Bank identifies six dimensions of governance in its Worldwide Governance Indicators: (1) voice and accountability; (2) political stability and the absence of violence; (3) government
effectiveness; (4) regulatory quality; (5) rule of law; and (6) control of corruption. 21 This illustrates how circular some of the definitions of rule of law can be;
rule of law requires good governance, but a measure of governance is the rule of
law. These governance indicators are a mixture of rule of law means and ends,
and of procedural and substantive interventions and outcomes.
However, definitions of governance vary widely. 22 A recent review of governance literature for legal scholars suggested the following definition: "Governance may be defined as organized efforts to manage the course of events in a
social system. Governance is about how people exercise power to achieve the
ends they desire, so disputes about ends are tied inextricably to assessments of
governance means."23
Governance is more than simply government or the sum of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers. More than a decade ago, a leading scholar in the
field of public administration, Professor George Frederickson, observed that the
field was moving "toward theories of cooperation, networking, governance, and
institution building and maintenance" in response to the "declining relationship
between jurisdiction and public management" in a "fragmented and disarticulated
state." 24 In a recent comprehensive study, Professor Mark Bevir observed that a
19. Margaret Levi and Brad Eppcrly, Principled Principalsin the FoundingMoments of the Rule of
Law, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RULE OF LAW 192 (JAMES J. HECKMAN, ROBERT L. NELSON,
AND LEE CABATINGAN, EDS., 2010).
20. James J. Heckman, The Viability of the Welfare State, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RULE
OF LAW 94 (JAMES J. HECKMAN, ROBERT L. NELSON, AND LEE CABATINGAN, EDS., 2010).
21. World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators, available at http://info.worldbank.org/
governance/wgi/indcx.asp (last accessed Mar. 7,2011).
22. For a review of the current theories and literature on governance, see Scott Burris et al., Changes
in Governance: A Cross-DisciplinaryReview of CurrentScholarship, 41 AKRON L. REV. 1 (2008).
23. Burris, et al., supranote 22, at 3.
24. H. George Frederickson, The RepositioningofAmerican Public Administration,
32 PS: POLITICAL SCIENCE AND POLITICs 701, 702 (1999). The seminal works in public affairs are
THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002),
and Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611 (2001); see also Daniel J. Fiorino, Rethinking Environmental Regulation:
Perspectiveson Law and Governance,23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 441 (1999).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2011/iss1/5

4

Bingham: Bingham: Reflections on Designing Governance

No. 1] Reflections on Designing Governanceto Produce the Rule ofLaw

71

variety of academic disciplines use the word 'governance' without engaging each
other; he suggests the following as the most general meaning:
[G]overnance refers to theories and issues of social coordination and the
nature of all patterns of rule. More specifically, governance refers to various new theories and practices of governing and the dilemmas to which
they give rise. These new theories, practices, and dilemmas place less
emphasis than did their predecessors on hierarchy and the state, and more
on markets and networks.25
This identifies three distinctive features of modern governance: it is hybrid, multijurisdictional, and has plural stakeholders who operate in networks. 26
In legal scholarship, this understanding of governance is sometimes referred
to as "the new governance," which includes the use of policy tools that involve
privatization of previously public work and devolution of responsibility from
unitary bureaucracies to networks and contractors.27 Some have characterized
new governance legal scholarship as a new form of legal realism, one that looks
pragmatically at law in context and in action; these legal scholars "seek[] to reinvent governance from the 'bottom up' by rejecting ancient administrative strategies of command and control and replacing them with a continuous dynamic
8
process governed by the relevant stakeholders." 2
Another related stream of literature concerns "collaborative governance."29
Collaborative governance includes the public and stakeholders in decision-making
across the policy continuum through deliberative democracy, collaborative public
management, and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in the policy process; these
30
provide ways for people to exercise voice and to work together in governance.
25. Mark Bevir, Governance as Theory, Practice, and Dilemma, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF
GOVERNANCE I (MARK BEVIR, ED., 2011).
26. Id. at 2.
27. See, Symposium New Governance and the Transformationof Law, 2010 Wis.L. REV. 1(2010);
Bradley C. Karkkainen, Reply, "New Governance" in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting
as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REv. 471 (2004); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The
FallofRegulation and the Rise ofGovernance in ContemporaryLegal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342
(2004); Orly Lobel, Surreply, Setting the Agendafor New Governance Research, 89 MINN. L. REV. 498
(2004); Richard Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437
(2003); Louise G. Trubek, Public Interest Lawyers and New Governance: Advocatingfor Healthcare,
2002 Wis. L. REv. 575; Louise G. Trubek, New Governance andSoft Law in Health Care Reform, 3
IND. HEALTH L. REV. 139 (2006).
28. Howard Erlanger et al., Is it Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 335, 357; see
also, Joanne Scott & David M. Trubek, Mind the Gap: Law andNew Approaches to Governance in the
European Union, 8 EUR. L.J. 1 (2002); Louise G. Trubek & Maya Das, Achieving Equality: Healthcare Governance in Transition,29 AM. J.L. & MED. 395 (2003).
29. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U.L. REV. 543 (2000). Professor
Freeman argued that public/private interdependence is a reality best understood as a set of negotiated
relationships in which "public and private actors negotiate over policy making, implementation, and
enforcement." She ultimately rejected the term governance in favor of "problems to confront and
decisions to make," observing "[t]here is nothing to govern." Id. at 548. She advocated institutional
analysis and design, arguing that institutional design should move away from the traditional legislative,
executive, and judicial branches to an examination of alternative private institutions and stakeholders
and the role they can effectively play in governance.
30. Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Collaborative Governance: Emerging Practicesand the Incomplete
Legal Frameworkfor Citizen andStakeholder Voice, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 269 (2009). (Inthis article, I
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Upstream in policy formation, collaborative governance entails dialogue and deliberation, or deliberative democracy, 3' as contrasted with the traditional adversarial
processes of governance, which usually entail debate. Deliberative democracy
uses a variety of models and techniques for engaging the public and stakeholders. 32 Midstream in policy implementation, collaborative governance also entails
collaborative public management, through which agencies and stakeholder organizations from the private and nonprofit sectors cooperate to provide public services through a variety of contractual arrangements or policy tools.33 Downstream,
collaborative governance generally entails ADR in quasi-judicial or judicial government contexts. 4
Collaborative governance can include the broadest scope of partners within
and outside government, including the public, transnational, national, state, regional, and local government agencies, indigenous peoples, nonprofit organizations, businesses, and other nongovernmental stakeholders.35 Collaborative governance produces participatory decision-making. It may produce transparency
by forcing government to provide information to the public in order to allow them
to participate. This in turn can provide accountability by allowing the public to
exercise voice in government. In theory, collaborative governance may be more
efficient than hierarchical decision-making, in that many diverse voices provide
describe the spectrum of collaborative governance processes as including dialogue and deliberation,
collaborative public management, and alternative dispute resolution. I argue they represent a single
related phenomenon of non-adversarial voice that operates across the policy continuum, including
legislative, executive, and judicial functions).
31. In dialogue, participants engage in a reasoned exchange of viewpoints, in an atmosphere of
mutual respect and civility, in a neutral space or forum, with an effort to reach a better mutual understanding and sometimes even consensus. In debate, participants listen in an effort to identify weaknesses in the argument and score points in an effective counterargument; in deliberation and dialogue,
participants listen in an effort to better understand the other's viewpoint and identify questions or areas
of confusion to probe for a deeper understanding. Deliberation is the thoughtful consideration of
information, views, and ideas. For a number of case studies and essays on deliberative democracy, see
DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS
IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY
GOVERNANCE (Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright eds., 2003), and THE DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
HANDBOOK: STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE Civic ENGAGEMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (John

Gastil & Peter Levine eds., 2005).
32. These include the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting, Appreciative Inquiry, Bohmian
Dialogue, Citizen ChoiccWork Dialogues, Citizens Juries, Compassionate Listening, Consensus Conferences, Conversation Cafd, Deliberative Polling, Dynamic Facilitation and the Wisdom Council,
Future Search, Intergroup Dialogue, National Issues Forums, Nonviolent Communication, Online
D&D, Open Space Technology, Public Conversations Project, Study Circles, Sustained Dialogue,
Wisdom Circles, and World Cafd, among others. For more information, see National Coalition for
Dialogue and Deliberation, http://ncdd.org/rc/itcm/4856 (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
33. See generally ROBERT AGRANOFF, MANAGING WITHIN NETWORKS: ADDING VALUE TO PUBLIC

ORGANIZATIONS (2007); ROBERT AGRANOFF & MICHAEL MCGUIRE, COLLABORATIVE PUBLIC
MANAGEMENT: NEW STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (2003); EUGENE BARDACH, GETTING
AGENCIES TO WORK TOGETHER: THE PRACTICE AND THEORY OF MANAGERIAL CRAFTSMANSHIP
(1998); BIG IDEAS IN COLLABORATIVE PUBLIC MANAGEMENT (Lisa Blomgren Bingham & Rosemary
O'Leary eds., 2008); THE COLLABORATIVE PUBLIC MANAGER (Rosemary O'Leary & Lisa Blomgren

Bingham eds., 2009).
34. See generally, JEROME T. BARRETT WITH JOSEPH BARRETT, A HISTORY OF ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE STORY OF A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL MOVEMENT (2004); see
also, the website of the Federal Interagency ADR Working Group, www.adr.gov (last accessed Mar.
14,2011).
35. See, e.g., the E-Government Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3606 (2002).
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government with better and more complete information upon which to base decisions.36
Using these new understandings of governance, the range of interventions
available to dispute systems designers interested in the rule of law encompasses
not only institutional reforms within the branches of government, but also experiments that entail partnerships with a variety of stakeholders and the public outside
government. The question is how to relate experiments in this broader conception
of governance to the notion of good governance.
Within the U.S. executive branch, the legal framework for governance strikes
a balance among five fundamental values in the relationship between the government and the governed that represent good governance: accountability, efficiency,
transparency, participation, and collaboration.38 These values recognize the im36. See, e.g., Obama, supra note 15.
37. Burris, et al., supra note 22, at 3, observed:
"Governance" is not synonymous with "good governance." Any given contemporary governance
system may be inefficient, corrupt, or unresponsive to the needs of the governed. Governance can
be "good" in at least two senses: it can deliver good results and it can work through processes
and institutions that meet broadly accepted standards of justice and due process. Ideally governance is good in both of these ways, and, indeed, many people believe that governance that fails
the second criterion normally will have difficulty delivering on the first.
This definition also recognizes the distinction between means and ends in discussions of the rule of
law.
38. A comprehensive survey of the literature regarding these values is beyond the scope of this
Article. For thoughtful discussions of one or more of these values in administrative law and process,
see, e.g., David L. Markell, "Slack" in the AdministrativeState and its Implicationsfor Governance:
The Issue of Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1, 19-40 (2005) (examining the relationship between
transparency and accountability); David L. Markell & Tom R. Tyler, Using Empirical Research to
Design Government Citizen ParticipationProcesses:A Case Study ofCitizens' Roles in Environmental
Compliance and Enforcement, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2008) (examining empirical evidence regarding
claims that citizen participation leads to inefficient decision-making); Jim Rossi, ParticipationRun
Amok: The Costs of Mass Participationfor DeliberativeAgency Decisionmaking,92 Nw. U. L. REV,
173 (1997) (arguing that mass participation in agency decision-making is economically inefficient and
comes at the expense of deliberative democratic practice); Edward Rubin, The Myth ofAccountability
and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (2005) (providing an in depth analysis of
theories of administrative accountability and debunking many of them); Mark Scidenfeld, A Civic
Republican Justificationfor the BureaucraticState, 105 HARV. L, REV. 1511, 1541 (1992) (advocating
deliberative public participation early in the policy development process in administrative agencies as
a means of ensuring accountability and legitimacy); Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders:
Limits on Collaborationas the Basisfor Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411 (2000)
(critiquing arguments in favor of collaboration as a means to make the regulatory system more efficient, and arguing for participation by a community of individuals with common interests who
represent and are accountable to stakeholders); Mark Scidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability
and PoliticalReview ofAgency Rules, 51 DuKE L.J. 1059 (2001) (examining and critiquing Office of
Management and Budget scrutiny of cost-benefit analyses, congressional committee oversight of
rulemaking, and congressional fast-track review as means of accountability); Richard B. Stewart, US.
Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative Law?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Summer/Autumn 2005, at 63 (examining how U.S. administrative law might provide a model for making
global regulatory regimes more accountable through participation, transparency, and judicial review).
One might argue that substantive effectiveness as part of efficiency. Personalcommunication with
Prof David L. Markell on Feb. 27, 2010 (on file with author). On the other hand, it may be a sixth
value. Substantive effectiveness is reflected in administrative law through requirements for cost benefit analysis. See generally, John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 395 (2008). It is also reflected in the Government Performance and Results
Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1105-1119, 9703-9704 (2006), which requires agencies to develop strategic plans
and establish metrics for the success of their work. Yet a third alternative is that all administrative
laws seek to improve the quality of substantive decision-making by addressing the forms and sources
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portance of governance as a relation among government, stakeholders, and the
broader public outside government. Transparency provides information to those
outside government. Participation allows those outside government to provide
information and exercise voice as to government decision-making. Collaboration
allows government to take advantage of other social resources, those of stakeholders and the public, to help manage the process of making, implementing, and enforcing decisions in the social system through cooperation.
Designing governance in the modem world means more than simply creating
a constitution that establishes branches of government and well functioning public
institutions. It means more than fair elections. Governance necessarily entails a
complex dance with public, private, or nonprofit stakeholders and with the public
more generally to make, implement, and enforce the law. Governance happens as
a function of system dynamics; government's branches and agencies interact with
each other, with stakeholders, and with the public.39 To achieve the rule of law,
we must design interventions with a view toward how they fit in this larger system
context of governance.
III. DISPUTE SYSTEMS DESIGN ACROSS THE POLICY CONTINUUM
This article argues that rule of law initiatives can benefit from dispute systems design that considers these initiatives in their larger governance context
across the policy continuum. First, this section will introduce the field of dispute
systems design (DSD). Second, this section will briefly define the policy continuum for collaborative governance and rule of law interventions. Third, it will
examine failures in the rule of law through this lens. Finally, it analyzes one area
of rule of law work, international election principles, from the perspective of
DSD.
A. Dispute Systems Design
A conflict, issue, dispute, or case submitted to any institution for managing
conflict (including one labeled ADR) exists in the context of a system of rules,
processes, steps, and forums. In the field of ADR, this is called dispute systems
design (DSD)." In its initial usage, DSD applied to systems for managing ripe
conflicts. For example, the model system is the collectively bargained grievance
procedure. Unions submit breach of contract claims to a grievance procedure
culminating in the quasi-judicial forum of labor arbitration. 4 1 Early work on DSD
examined how inserting a mediation step before arbitration, termed 'grievance
mediation,' might change the dynamics of the system as a whole, speeding up the
of information upon which agencies act. Thus, the five values reflect the use of process; cffcctiveness
examines outcome.
39. See generally, Eugene Bardach, Policy Dynamics, in MICHAEL MORAN, MARTIN REIN, AND
ROBERT E. GOODIN, EDS., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC POLICY 336 (2006) (examining system
dynamics in governance, a relatively new perspective and field).
40. LISA BLOMGREN BINGHAM, JANET K. MARTINEZ, AND STEPHANIE SMITH, DISPUTE SYSTEMS
DESIGN: PREVENTING, MANAGING, AND RESOLVING CONFLICT (forthcoming).
41. See WILLIAM L. URY, ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT
THE COST OF CONFLICT 56 (Jossey-Bass, Inc. 1988).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2011/iss1/5

8

Bingham: Bingham: Reflections on Designing Governance

No. 1] Reflections on Designing Governance to Produce the Rule ofLaw

75

overall resolution of conflict and reducing the number of cases that required a
more costly outside arbitrator.42
DSD is the applied discipline of institutional design; DSD scholars work in
the fields of law, 43 human resources management," and organizational development. 45 Smith and Martinez explained that DSD entails understanding nested
institutions by analyzing their goals, processes and structures, stakeholders, resources, success, and accountability." Professors William Ury, Jeanne Brett, and
Stephen Goldberg described the purposeful creation of an ADR program in an
organization to manage conflict through a series of steps or options for process.4 7
In its best practice, DSD also uses inclusive, participatory, stakeholder-driven
processes to change existing or create new dispute resolution structures. 48 Its goal
is to improve the capacity of systems to prevent, manage, or resolve certain
streams or kinds of conflict.
There are related literatures in political science and other social science disciplines that shed light on its broader context: systems through which humans
organize themselves for collective action. Institutional Analysis and Development
(LAD) is an effort to explore and explain the wide diversity of institutions that
humans use to govern their behavior. 49 Institutions arise, operate, evolve, and
change.50 Similarly, DSDs are institutions for resolving conflict that are also
42. Jeanne M. Brett and Stephen B. Goldberg, Mediation in the Coal Industry: A Field Experiment,
37 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 49 (1983). Brett and Goldberg studied DSD in the coal industry. After a
series of wildcat strikes, it became clear that the traditional multi-step grievance procedure culminating
in binding arbitration was not meeting the needs of coal miners, unions, and management. As an
alternative, the parties tried an experiment: grievance mediation. This involved providing mediation,
a process for resolving conflict based on interests, as soon as disputes arosc. The addition of the grievance mediation step changed the traditional rights-based grievance arbitration dispute system design to
one including an interest-based 'loop-back', i.e., a step that returned the disputants to negotiation,
albeit with assistance.
43. Stephanie Smith and Janet K. Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute Systems Design, 14
HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 123 (2009).
44. See, e.g., DAVID B. LIPSKY, RONALD L. SEEBER & RICHARD D. FINCHER, EMERGING SYSTEMS
FOR MANAGING WORKPLACE CONFLICT. LESSONS FROM AMERICAN CORPORATIONS FOR MANGERS
AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROFESSIONALS (2003).
45. See, e.g., CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY ORGANIZATIONS (Jossey-Bass 1996).
46. Smith and Martinez, supra note 43, at 133.
47. WILLIAM L. URY, ET AL., GETrING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE
COST OF CONFLICT 41--64 (1988). Interest-based systems focus on the disputants' underlying needs
(interests), such as those for security, economic well-being, belonging to a social group, recognition
from others, and autonomy or control. Rights-based processes focus on legal entitlements under the
language of a contract, statute, regulation, or court decision. Power-based systems are least effective
as a basis for resolving conflict; workplace examples include strikes, lockouts, and corporate campaigns.
48. COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 45, at 49-66.
49. See

generally,

ELINOR

OSTROM,

GOVERNING

THE COMMONS:

THE

EVOLUTION

OF

INSTITUTIONs FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (Cambridge University Press 1990); ELINOR OSTROM,
UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY (Princeton University Press 2005). Examples of the
diversity of its application include "regularized social interactions in markets, hierarchies, families,
sports, legislatures, elections" and others. Id. at 5. The study of institutional design is the subject of
literature in political science, economics, sociology, public affairs, and policy analysis.
50. Ostrom, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY, supra note 49, at 6. Ostrom attempted to
identify an underlying set of universal building blocks and a method for researching institutions and
how they function. She argued that these universal building blocks are arranged in layers that one can
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amenable to institutional analysis. 5 A key feature of the LAD framework is to
examine institutions as nested action arenas. The notions of DSD and nested institutions can clarify how we think of initiatives directed at producing the rule of law
by helping to see initiatives in relation to each other and the overarching governance system.
Pursuant to the Constitution, the U.S. government has created civil and criminal justice systems or DSDs. In the context of a single national government, many
ADR systems exist in the shadow of these traditional justice systems; in this way
they are nested in courts.52 For example, DSD encompasses the creation of systems for processing many similar claims in court, as in mass torts and special
claim processing facilities that are nested in the judicial branch.m It also encompasses the creation of systems within administrative agencies for handling both
their own internal conflict and for carrying out their public mission to create, implement, and enforce public policy; these are nested in the executive branch subject to review by the judicial branch.55
Over the past three decades, there has been considerable research on dispute
resolution systems in various substantive contexts, including court programs5 and
programs in employment, education, the environment, 9 community mediaanalyze using the IAD framework. A basic building block is an action arena or action situation. To
analyze an action situation, Ostrom used seven categories of information:
(1) the set of participants [single individuals or corporate actors], (2) the positions to be filled by
participants, (3) the potential outcomes, (4) the set of allowable actions and the function that
maps actions into realized outcomes [action-outcome linkages], (5) the control that an individual
has in regards to this function, (6) the information available to participants about actions and outcomes and their linkages, and (7) costs and benefits - which serve as incentives and deterrents assigned to actions and outcomes.
These are the common structural components that represent the building blocks for all institutions at
their most general level. Id. at 32, and see generally Chapter 2, at 32-68. Ostrom explained how to
operationalize these concepts using game theory to structure experiments in a laboratory in Chapter 3,
at 69-98.
51. Kenneth M. Ehrenberg, Procedural Justice and Information in Conflict-Resolving Institutions,
67 ALB. L. REV. 167, 175-76 (2003).
52. Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, Symposium on CivilJustice Reform: "Most Cases Settle": Judicial
Promotionand Regulation ofSettlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339, 1349-50 (1994).
53. See, e.g., Francis E. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities,57 STAN. L.
REV. 1361 (2005).
54. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Has the Fat Lady Sung? The Futureof Mass Toxic Torts, 26 REv.
LITIG. 883 (2007).
55. See generally, Lisa Blomgren Bingham, CollaborativeGovernance: Emerging Practicesand
the Incomplete Legal Framework for Citizen and Stakeholder Voice, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 269 (2009);
Lisa B. Bingham, ct al., The New Governance: Practices and Processesfor Stakeholder and Citizen
Participation in the Work of Government, 65 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 547 (2005).
56. For an analysis of evaluations of state and federal court ADR programs with descriptions of
their design, see The Resolution Systems Institute, http://aboutrsi.org/publications.php?slD=9 (last
visited Mar. 6, 2011); The Federal Judicial Center, http://www.fjc.gov/library/fjccatalog.nsf (last
visited Mar. 6, 2011); Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the "Vanishing Trial": The Growth and
Impact of "Alternative Dispute Resolution, " I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 843 (2004); for a recent
review of court-connected ADR using DSD as its organizing frame, see Roselle L. Wissler, The Effectiveness of Court-Connected Dispute Resolution in Civil Cases, 22 CONFLicT RES. Q. 55 (2004); John
Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith Participation in CourtConnectedMediationPrograms, 50 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 69 (2002).
57. Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Dispute Resolution: The Casefor Mediation, 22 CONFLicr RES.
Q. 145 (2004) (concluding that DSDs using mediation has proven itself capable of producing positive
organizational outcomes, while there is no evidence that non-union employment arbitration has that
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tion,a family and domestic relations,6 ' and victim-offender mediation or restorative justice.62 With the exception of ADR in the environment, most of these sysimpact); and sco also related commentary, David B. Lipsky & Arid C. Avgar, Commentary: Research
on Employment Dispute Resolution: Towarda New Paradigm,22 CONFLICT RES. Q. 175 (2004) (advocating multivariate models and more sophisticated statistical techniques to measure the impact of
employment dispute resolution).
58. Tricia S. Jones, Conflict Resolution Education: The Field, the Findings, and the Future, 22
CONFLICT RES. Q. 233, 243-51 (2004) (reporting that peer mediation in the elementary schools has
positive outcomes for student mediators in that they gain in social and emotional intelligence, and
schools gain in improved classroom and school climate, while there is some but less evidence for
middle school and high school programs, and arguing for more assessment on curriculum, including
conflict resolution, bullying prevention, dialogue and communicative arts); Jennifer Batton, Commentary: Considering Conflict Resolution Education: Next Steps for Institutionalization, 22 CONFLICT
REs. Q. 269, 270-76 (2004) (arguing for institutionalization of conflict resolution education across
programs and for all educators).
59. E. Franklin Dukes, What We Know About Environmental Conflict Resolution: An Analysis
Based on Research, 22 CONFLICT RES. Q. 191, 192 (2004) (identifying key structural elements that
distinguish environmental conflict resolution from other uses of mediation, including its use for upstream conflict in policy making and planning); Kirk Emerson, Rosemary O'Leary, & Lisa B. Bingham, Commentary: Comment on FrankDukes's "What We Know About Environmental Conflict Resolution, " 22 CONFLICT REs. Q. 221, 223-29 (2004) (describing a national database for environmental
conflict resolution cases through which data on design differences and outcomes will accumulate over
time).
60. Timothy Hedeen, The Evolution and Evaluation of Community Mediation: Limited Research
Suggests UnlimitedProgress, 22 CONFLICT RES. Q. 101 (2004) (reporting that community mediation
centers handle cases in a cost and time effective way while resolving a broad array of disputes in an
appropriate and respectful way). On the need for research related to program design, Hedcen observed, "[o]rganizational level research into case screening criteria and methods, referral systems and
funding relationships, program accessibility, and outreach efforts will benefit the field greatly, providing the basis for informed planning and decision making, as well as enhanced services." Id. at 126.
He also raised the question of whether community mediation democratizes justice and leads to greater
self-sufficiency. Id at 127. See also Linda Baron, Commentary: The Casefor the FieldofCommunity
Mediation, 22 CONFLICT REs. Q. 135, 135-36 (2004) (articulating a strategy for action through consistent data collection across varying centers implemented through a mini-grant program by the National
Association for Community Mediation with support from the Hewlett Foundation).
61. Joan B. Kelly, Family Mediation Research: Is There Empirical Support for the Field?, 22
CONFLICT RES. Q. 3 (2004). Kelly's introduction highlights our need for more systematic institutional
analysis in dispute system design: Variations in research populations, methodologies, measures, and
dispute settings have been the norm, making it problematic to generalize about family mediation or
rely on a single study. Many research publications failed to provide basic descriptors, such as the
nature of the population served, number of sessions and hours of service, the model (if any) mediators
used, and whether premediation screening was used. Legal rules and cultural contexts of the jurisdiction that might affect outcomes were rarely described. Despite these problems, convergence on many
questions has emerged over two decades, indicating that some major findings regarding family mediation are robust and replicable across settings. Id. at 3-4. Based on studies of mediation in California,
Colorado, Ohio, Virginia, and Ontario, Canada, Kelly concluded that mediation has proven itself
capable of settling highly emotional disputes (settlement rates range from 50 to 90 percent) with durable resolutions and high participant satisfaction, although higher when there is an agreement than
without Id. at 28-29. In addition, she reported that participants felt that they were heard, respected,
given a chance to say what was important, and not pressured to settle. Id. at 29. They also felt they
had learned to work together and that the agreement would be good for their children. Id at 29. See
also Donald T. Saposnck, Commentary: The Future of History of Family Mediation Research, 22
CONFLICT RES. Q. 37, 38-49 (2004) (advocating research that is longitudinal, and examines antecedent
conditions, screening and triage of cases, the actual process of mediation, and outcomes for children).
62. Mark S. Umbrcit, Robert B. Coates, & Betty Vos, Victim-Offender Mediation: Three Decades
ofPracticeand Research, 22 CONFLICT REs. Q. 279, 287-96 (2004) (concluding that victim-offender
mediation is usually effective at meeting the needs of those who participate, generally has a positive
impact on restitution and recidivism rates, and has potential to reduce the costs of certain juvenile and
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tems address conflict downstream in the policy process and provide an alternative
to agency adjudication or judicial branch civil and criminal justice systems.
While the designs of these systems vary widely, research on why systems take
certain designs in certain substantive and institutional contexts, and which designs
are most effective, is still in its infancy.
DSD is a lens through which to examine not only domestic justice systems,
but also emerging global ones. In the absence of an authoritative global sovereign, all dispute resolution for conflict that crosses national borders depends upon
consent. Nation-states consent to a dispute resolution process or forum through
treaties; for transnational private conflict, disputants consent through contracts.
Treaties incorporate conciliation, mediation, or arbitration for disputes, sometimes
through new international courts.63 Moreover, entities such as the European Union (EU) are fostering the creation of private dispute resolution mechanisms."
The World Bank65 and USAID6 are pressing for private dispute resolution systems as basic legal infrastructure. As it becomes clear that international law is
essentially systems for international dispute resolution, it also becomes clear that
DSD can help structure these new systems.
B. Governanceand DSD Across the PolicyProcess
The international community sponsors rule of law initiatives that seek to address varieties of conflict within a nation-state, including those stemming from a
past or ongoing civil war or insurgency, the breakdown of civil society following
a disaster, or transition from one form of government to another. However, these
interventions are often haphazard or directed at a single branch of government or
institution within that branch as the means; consequently, they do not always
achieve rule of law ends. Dr. Rachel Kleinfeld observed that "because achieving
such ends requires reform across institutions while institutional reforms are generally carried out within single institutions, institutional reform can be undertaken
with no significant effect on rule-of-law ends."6

criminal cases); Howard Zchr, Commentary: Restorative Justice: Beyond Victim-Offender Mediation,
22 CONFLICT RES. Q. 305, 305-06 (2004) (describing other models of restorative justice, including
family group conferences and peacemaking circles).
63. See, e.g., International Court of Justice, http://www.icj-cij.org (last visited 3/6/11); see also
World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org (last visited Mar. 6,2011).
64. See Europa Press Releases: A boost for mediation in civil and commercial matters: European
Parliament endorses new rules, http://curopa.cu/rapid/pressRccasesAction.do?rcfercncc=1P/
08/628&format-HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=cn (last accessed Mar. 6, 2011).
65. See World Bank: Knowledge Resources for Financial and Private Sector Development,
http://rru.worldbank.org/Toolkits/AltemativeDisputeResolution (last accessed Mar. 6, 2011).
66. See generally, USAID: Users Guide to DG Programming, 55 (2010), available at
http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/dcmocracyandgovcmance/publications/pdfs/DG-UserGuideNove
mberlO.pdf (last accessed Mar. 6, 2011), which references the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Services' work assisting countries with industrial dispute systems design and consensus building.
67. Klcinfeld, supra note 3, at 34; see also Gary Goodpaster, Law Reform in Developing Countries,
in LAW REFORM IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL STATES 106 (TIM LINDSEY, ED., 2007) (discuss-

ing the necessity of social and political context in designing legal reform efforts to achieve the rule of
law).
68. Klcinfield, supra note 3, at 34.
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To achieve the end or goal of the comprehensive rule of law, designers must
view these interventions more systemically and holistically. This argument is
consistent with the critique of sequentialism in rule of law scholarship. Sequentialism is the theory that political and civil liberties and democratic reform cannot
take place until a country has achieved a certain level of economic development.69
Thomas Carothers is critical of this theory, in that he argued it assumes authoritarian leaders will bring democratic reform to their people, but they have a conflict
of interest with their own people. 0 Thus, instead of approaching economic development and democratization sequentially, Carothers argued that international aid
groups must seek both through interwoven initiatives. 7 ' They must examine interventions as nested in institutions across the entire policy process, which includes the legislative, executive, and judicial powers or branches within government as a whole.
At its most general, the policy process consists of stages in a continuous and
dynamic system. The stages include identifying policy problems; identifying
approaches or tools for solving the policy problems; 72 setting priorities among
these approaches or tools; selecting from among the priorities; drafting proposed
legislation; enacting legislation; identifying policy problems left for the executive
to resolve within the boundaries of the legislation; identifying approaches or tools
for regulations and other management strategies; setting priorities for these; selecting from among them; drafting proposed regulations; enacting regulations;
implementing regulations (through project or program management, permits, etc.);
enforcing law through executive agency adjudication; and enforcing law through
litigation within the jurisdiction of the judicial power.73 Collaborative governance
entails collaboration with stakeholders and the public across this continuum.
At each stage in the policy process, there is an opportunity to design an intervention intended to produce the rule of law. However, the complexity of policy
dynamics is such that the impact of an isolated intervention may be swamped by
the forces at play elsewhere in the policy process and in the other branches of
government and institutions of governance.

C Lessonsfor Designfrom Salient Failuresin the Rule of Law
By viewing the policy process and these nested institutions more holistically,
we can begin to see why the rule of law fails; sometimes we can learn more from
failures than successes. The Third Reich represents perhaps the most salient failure of the rule of law in living memory. Interestingly, the Federal Judicial Center
and the Holocaust Museum have collaborated on a professional development se69. Thomas Carothers, Rule of Law Temptations, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RULE OF LAW,
17,22-23 (JAMES J. HECKMAN, ROBERT L. NELSON, AND LEE CABATINGAN, EDS., 2010).
70. Id. at 23.
71. Id. at 24.
72. See generally THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE (Lester Salamon ed., 2002). For a discussion of the analysis and selection of policy instruments, see B. Guy Pcters, The Politics ofTool Choice, id. at 552.
73. See generally Eugene Bardach, Policy Dynamics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC
POLICY 336 (Michael Moran, Martin Rein & Robert E. Goodin, cds., 2008) (examining system dynamics in governance, a relatively new perspective and field) and THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE
(Mark Bevir ed., 2011) (a comprehensive examination of both the theory and practice of governance) .
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minar for the federal bench using legal materials showing the history of the Third
Reich and tracking its descent from the rule of law into the Holocaust. 74 This
history recounts how President Paul von Hindenburg appointed Adolf Hitler as
Reich Chancellor on January 30, 1933; on February 4, Hitler's cabinet tamped
down on dissent by limiting free press and directing the police to ban political
meetings and marches. 7 On February 27, a Dutch militant set fire to the Reichstag, which was the German parliament building; Nazi leaders seized upon the
Reichstag fire to declare an emergency by alleging that the fire was part of a
Communist plot against the state.76 Hitler then effectively eviscerated the legislative branch with the complacence of the judicial branch through the Reichstag Fire
Decree. This decree suspended key political and civil rights provisions of the
Constitution indefinitely.78 The decree then became permanent. The German
Supreme Court defined its role as a limited one, in the civil or continental law
tradition; it did not step in to protect human or civil rights during the period after
the decree. 79 The executive branch used security forces (the Gestapo and the Kripo) to take 25,000 people in Prussia alone into "protective custody" or "preventive
arrest" based on their presumed threat to the public order, not on evidence of
crimes committed; those imprisoned did not receive specific charges and they
were incarcerated indefinitely.80 The judicial branch essentially condoned this
executive branch action.8 '
Hitler next hijacked the legislative branch through the Law to Remedy the
Distress of the People and the Reich (the Enabling Act) on March 24, 1933.82

Hitler framed this "law" as a constitutional amendment that provided an alternative procedure for adopting laws; it provided that the Reich Government could
enact laws unilaterally, issued by Hitler as Chancellor, which took effect the following day, without the participation of the legislature.83 It also provided that
these laws could deviate from the Constitution as long as they did not affect the
74. See generally WILLIAM F. MEINECKE, JR. & ALEXANDRA ZAPRUDER, LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE

HOLOCAUST (Kathryn Grunder ed., United States Holocaust Memorial Museum 2009), available at
http://www.ushmm.org/cducation/foreducators/resource/ (scroll down the page to access individual
sections under "Law, Justice, and the Holocaust") (last accessed Mar. 23, 2011). The story is chilling
in its echoes for the present United States legal and institutional response to the terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center on September 11, 2001.
75. Id at 8.

76. Id
77. Id at 9-10 (reprinting an English translation of the decree).
78. Id. at 9. Article I provided that:
Sections 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, and 153 of the Constitution of the German Reich are suspended until further notice. Therefore, restrictions on personal liberty, on the right of free expression of opinion, including freedom of the press, on the right of assembly and the right of association, and violations of the privacy of postal, telegraphic, and telephonic communications,
warrants for house searches, orders for confiscations, as well as restrictions on property, are also
permissible beyond the legal limits otherwise prescribed.
Id.
79. Id. at 11.
80. Id.
81. See id. (those held "had no right to appeal or access to a lawyer, and their arrests were not liable
to judicial review").
82. MEINECKE & ZAPRUDER, supra note 74, at 15 (reprinting an English translation of the Act).
83. Id. (see Articles I to 3 indicating that "laws of the Reich may also be enacted by the Reich
Govcrnment" and they "shall take effect on the day following the announcement").
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institutions of the Reichstag and the Reichsrat.M Since it was a constitutional
amendment, it required a two-thirds vote of the legislative branch for passage; to
achieve this, Hitler used protective custody to detain 81 Communists and 120
Social Democrats in the legislature to prevent them from voting, and stationed
security forces in the chamber to intimidate the remaining legislators.85 Again, the
judicial branch failed to intervene but accepted at face value the vote of those
present; German judges accepted the legitimacy of the government.
Hitler's conquest of the judicial branch started with the Law for the Imposition and Implementation of the Death Penalty on March 29, 1933, which retroactively imposed the death penalty for certain crimes that were not punishable by
86
death at the time they were committed, in other words, an ex post facto law. In a
test case, the court permitted its enforcement as to defendant Marinus van der
Lubbe, but found his co-defendants not guilty.87 As a result, Hitler ousted the
Supreme Court of jurisdiction for political crimes and established a new court, the
Voksgericht, in Berlin instead; the Supreme Court acquiesced in its loss of jurisdiction.88 In the years that followed, Hitler enacted a comprehensive body of antiSemitic legislation, and the Supreme Court gave it broad deference and effect.89
The Supreme Court enforced statutes and edicts from the executive branch
through individual cases to rationalize and legalize the Holocaust.o
This is a story of broad institutional failure coordinated across three branches
of government; it is a story of acquiescence in the systematic elimination of
checks and balances on the exercise of unbridled power of the executive. It illustrates how the existence of the rule of law is a function of action by all three
branches, upstream and downstream in the policy process.
Another example, lesser in magnitude and scope, is Brazil. 9' In 1979, the
military junta that had deposed the civilian government and taken control over the
executive branch of government succeeded in getting the legislature to enact a
statute granting amnesty for political crimes that was later interpreted to cover
amnesty for government officials. The law is still in force, and has been construed
to grant amnesty for crimes against humanity. 92 Government violence continued
into the 1980s; thus, the law in effect has been interpreted to grant amnesty for
crimes that had not been committed at the time of its enactment. 93 That legislation established an executive branch body for granting reparations to certain categories of victims of the military coup and dictatorship.9 However, the legislation

84. Id. (see Article 2). At the time, there were two legislative institutions, the Reichstag and the
Reichsrat. The Reichstag refers both to the legislative institution and the building in which it is
housed. The Reichsrat is a house of the parliament representing the German states.
85. Id. at 14.
86. Id at 16.
87. Id.
88. MEINECKE & ZAPRUDER, supra note 74, at 16.
89. Id. at 32.
90. Id. at 32, 47, 49.
91. Jos6 Carlos Moreira da Silva Filho, Memory and National Reconciliation:The Amnesty Impasse
in the UnjinishedBrazilian Democratic Transition (draft paper in English on file with author).
92. Id. at 4.
93. Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer, Mediation as a Catalystfor JudicialReform in Latin America,
18 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 619, 628-631 (2003).
94. In a report to the International Criminal Court, Brazil described the background as follows:
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did not provide authority for that body to determine the truth, require executive
branch or wrongdoer transparency, or establish a process for national reconciliation. It provided the new agency no power to force the executive branch to disclose files. It attached no conditions to amnesty and required no confessions. 95
The judicial branch recently upheld this legislation as constitutional and limited.9
This example is interesting because amnesty and reparations are often means
to achieve reconciliation following civil unrest; they are intended as steps to restore the political order and rule of law. 97 Amnesty may be essential to reconstruct civil society after conflict; however, without truth and reconciliation, amnesty becomes a cover-up of official corruption." Reparations seem like hush
money.
One can argue that this law failed in its design. The executive branch failed
to provide transparency or truth. The legislative branch failed to engage the public and stakeholders in either the process of determining the acceptable conditions
for amnesty, or in the process of meeting those conditions and implementing a
grant of amnesty. The law provided for no judicial recourse for the underlying
crimes beyond the administrative and formulaic provision of limited financial
reparations. It did not operate across the policy continuum upstream or downstream to engage stakeholders and the public in governance. Moreover, the judicial branch failed to strike down a law prospectively granting amnesty for political
crimes. Together, there was a failure of the executive branch amplified by action
across the other two branches.
In the 1970s, under military rule, there wcre cases in which political dissidents were kidnapped
and assassinated by members of the security services. In the wake of the return to democracy
there have been demands for investigations to be carried out to identify the missing persons and
those responsible for their disappearance. To this end, the Ministry of Justice has been liaising
with the military ministries within the framework of a government commission established to review the matter. It should, however, be pointed out that the 1979 Amnesty Law, which allowed
thousands of political exiles to return to Brazil, grants general amnesty, both for political dissidents and for security agents responsible for violating human rights. No cases of people missing
for political reasons in Brazil have been reported since the mid-seventies.
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, INITIAL REPORTS OF STATES
PARTIES DUE IN 1993: BRAZIL (1995) http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/8D264D29-A062-4ED4-

BB48-C60CCBC70277/252957/377025.pdf.
95. Tracey Begley, InternationalLegal Updates, 17 HUM. RTs. BR. 40,41-42 (2010).
96. Brazil Court Upholds Law That Protects Torturers, AMNESTY INT'L (Apr. 30, 2010),
http://www.amnesty.org/cn/news-and-updates/brazil-court-upholds-law-protects-torturers-2010-04-30
(last accessed Mar. 21, 2011).
97. See, e.g., William Bradford, "With a Very GreatBlame on Our Hearts": Reparations, Reconciliation, and an American Indian Pleafor Peace with Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 1 (2003) (advocating reparations for crimes against Native Americans); Judith Schonsteiner, Academy on Human Rights
and HumanitarianLaw: Articles and Essays Analyzing Reparations in InternationalHuman Rights
Law: Dissuasive Measures and the "Society as a Whole:" A Working Theory of Reparations in the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 23 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 127, 130 (2007) (discussing repara-

tions as a means of making victims of injustice and violations of human rights law whole and specifically discussing nonmonetary reparations and the right to truth and observing that "Prevention of

recurrence cannot be achieved without considering the wider societal, legislative, executive, and judicial measures in the respective states"); and Carsten Stahn, Accommodating Individual CriminalResponsibility andNational Reconciliation: The UN Truth Commissionfor East Timor, 95 A.J.I.L. 952,

954 (2001) (discussing how "many peace agreements still combine truth and reconciliation mechanisms with amnesty provisions, international legal practice has clearly shifted from blanket amnesties
toward either conditional or limited amnesty models").
98. Begley, supra note 95, at 42.
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In each case, a failure in the rule of law may start in one branch, but it ultimately stems from coordinated action, or inaction, among and across the branches
and policy process as a whole. The respective executive, legislative, or judicial
powers of government fail to enact the rule of law. The overall system design for
government does not force them to. Moreover, the designs do not expressly provide for extensive collaboration with the public and stakeholders, or collaborative
governance, to provide an outside check on the executive branch. These cases
simply illustrate how we might begin to reexamine nested institutions across the
policy process and their relation to stakeholders and the public in connection with
the rule of law.

D. InternationalElection PrinciplesAcross the Policy Continuum
One essential means toward rule of law ends is establishing democracy
through legitimate elections.99 However, the following discussion will show that
achieving legitimate elections as a means to that end involves a sequence of both
substantive and procedural systems design elements across the policy process and
the three branches of government. It also necessarily entails action by the public
and stakeholders. For example, elections require substantive law in the form of a
constitutional provision and related enabling legislation that defines who is entitled to the franchise.'" Elections also require legislation creating a substantive
right to information transparency to ensure that voters have what they need to
exercise the substantive right to vote meaningfully.' 0 ' The legislative branch must
also enact procedural safeguards, enforceable through administrative and judicial
means, to ensure that voters may exercise the franchise. For example, nationstates must establish eligibility to be listed in a registry of voters to protect against
voter fraud.102 The legislative branch can also enact substantive anti-corruption
rules requiring disclosure of campaign contributions and financing. 0 3
The executive branch generally supervises the mechanics of an election; thus,
the legislative branch must provide a means of recourse, a procedural remedy, to
challenge executive branch action.'" In other words, the system design must
include processes for election dispute resolution. This may entail a process for
The national
appealing within the executive branch' 05 or to the judicial branch.'
system is nested within the international system, which may provide recourse to
other entities such as international courts to protect human rights.10 7 The means of
99. INTERNATIONAL ELECTION PRINCIPLES: DEMOCRACY & THE RULE OF LAW xii-xiv (John Hardin
Young, ed., 2009).
100. Patrick Merloc, Human Rights -The Basisfor Inclusiveness, Transparency,Accountability, and
Public Confidence in Elections, in INTERNATIONAL ELECTION PRINCIPLES: DEMOCRACY & THE RULE
OF LAW 3, 13 (John Hardin Young, cd., 2009).
101. Id at 19-20.

102. Id. at 14-15; see also Michael May & Brenner Allen, Voter Registration, in INTERNATIONAL
ELECTION PRINCIPLES, supra note 93, at 135, 144-50.
103. Ryan Patrick Phair & Laurel E. Shanks, Political Finance and Corrupt Practices, in
INTERNATIONAL ELECTION PRINCIPLES, supra note 93, at 347, 354-64.
104. Merloc, supra note 100, at 28-29.

105. Id. at 31-32.
106. Id. at 33.
107. Id at 23-25; see also, Benjamin E. Griffith and Michael S. Carr, Effective, Timely, Appropriate,
andEnforceable Remedies, in INTERNATIONAL ELECTION PRINCIPLES, supranote 100, at 373, 382-91,
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recourse should include a procedure for recounts 08 to challenge the outcome of an
election. 10
The public, other non-governmental organizations, and stakeholders also play
a critical role in legitimate elections. A free press ensures that candidates for election undergo critical scrutiny and are accountable." 0 Moreover, election monitor1
ing conducted by civil society can enhance both accountability and legitimacy.'
These are just a few illustrations of the procedural and substantive structural
components in the legislative, executive, and judicial branches and across the
policy continuum that are necessary elements of a dispute systems design for free
and fair elections as a means to achieve the rule of law.
IV. DESIGNING GOVERNANCE ACROSS THE BRANCHES AND THE POLICY
CONTINUUM TO PRODUCE THE RULE OF LAW
Many rule of law initiatives are efforts at reforming public institutions. It
may be helpful to reframe these efforts to achieve the rule of law through the lens
of DSD. This new frame would suggest that those seeking to design a system of
governance to achieve the rule of law consider the following steps:
*

*
*
*
*

Identify with more precision the ends, or goals, for achieving rule of law
in relation to the social, cultural, and institutional context"12 of each initiative;
Focus on the means of achieving these more contextualized rule of law
ends;
Categorize these means as substantive or procedural;
Identify where in the policy continuum they occur;
Identify how they are nested in the institutions that form government;

108. See generally John Hardin Young, Recounts, in INTERNATIONAL ELECTION PRINCIPLES, supra
note 100, at 283-306.
109. See generally Steve Bickerstaff, Contesting the Outcome of Elections, in INTERNATIONAL
ELECTION PRINCIPLES, supra note 100, at 307-344.
110. Merloc, supra note 100, at 38. Mcrloc observed: "Community forums, debates, broadcast
media, call-in shows, and interactive online programs, whether organized by citizen groups, media
outlets, EMBs [election management bodies], or others, provide information needed for clectors to
make informed voting decisions." Id.
111. Id. at 37; see also, Cameron Quinn, Conduct of Election Day, in INTERNATIONAL ELECTION
PRINCIPLES, supra note 100, at 241, 265-72.
112. See Ran Hirschl, The "Design Sciences" and Constitutional "Success", 87 TEx. L. REv. 1339,
1372 (2009). Professor Hirschl has identified a number of these in a recent review of the empirical
literature on constitutional design:
A quick look at other design domains, macro and micro, suggests that factors such as detailed
schemes, manageable size and scope, a low number of intervening factors, effective control mechanisms, built-in self-learning and adjustment mechanisms, and above all, sheer devotion and
genuine benevolence may enhance the chances of success of many planning experiments. But
when it comes to constitutional design, most of these lessons of the trade are overlooked or prove
difficult to achieve. Even more fundamentally, factors such as manageable population size, high
education and human capital, a developed market economy alongside a functional social safety
net, and strong state capacity account for democracy, prosperity, and human development more
than the institutional factors that often occupy constitutional engineers' vocabulary.
Id.
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Identify whether there are reinforcing structures across the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches;
Identify the role of the public, stakeholders, and informal institutions;
and
Identify metrics and indicators to measure how well they are achieving
rule of law ends in the context of the institution in which they are embedded."'

Ideally, the public and stakeholders should be part of the process of design. Of
necessity, many of the means for establishing the rule of law as an end will entail
engaging stakeholders and the public in the process of governance. The following
discussion will give a few examples of substantive and procedural rule of law
initiatives in relation to their legislative, executive, and judicial components.114

A. StructuralChoices in the Legislative Branch
The legislative branch can support collaborative governance through an appropriate legal framework for both the procedural and substantive elements of the
rule of law. For example, it can enact procedural laws on transparency, public
participation, and administrative process including judicial review. "' It can enact
the legal framework for mediation and arbitration, which are also procedural inIt can enact substantive laws on civil and political rights, and the
terventions.
protection of private property from expropriation. It can enact the legal framework for post-conflict reconstruction through substantive laws that establish the
conditions for a grant of amnesty, and through procedural laws that establish truth
and reconciliation processes.
As the legislature considers proposals, it can use dialogue and deliberation to
engage the public in identifying problems, solutions, and priorities for lawmaking."' 7 Legislative bodies commonly conduct public hearings or committee
hearings to collect background information in preparation of legislation. However, there are other ways of engaging the public, including deliberative democracy,
dialogue and deliberation, and public policy consensus-building efforts.

B. StructuralChoices in the Executive Branch
Interventions in the executive branch that contribute to the rule of law include
transparency both in process and records, for example, releasing documents and
113. Daniel B. Rodriguez, et al., The Rule of Law Unplugged, 59 EMORY L.J. 1455, 1471-72 (2010).
A more expansive discussion of the evaluation problem is outside the scope of this article.
114. A comprehensive analysis of all the possible structural components of a dispute systems design
of governance to produce the rule of law is beyond the scope of this first, and meager, effort.
115. Lisa Blomgren Bingham, The Next Generation ofAdministrative Law: Building the Legal Infrastructure for Collaborative Governance. 2010 Wis. L. REv. 297, 304 (2010).
116. Id. at 312.
117. For a related argument, see cf Mariana Hernandez Crespo, Building the Latin America We
Want: Supplementing Representative Democracies with Consensus-building, 10 CARDOzo J.
CONFLICr RESOL. 425 (2009) (arguing that adding a consensus-building function into the legislative
process lets the public contribute in a satisfactory way).
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files to the public. Examples of possible interventions include those modeled on
the Obama Administrations Open Government Initiative and similar initiatives
worldwide."' 8 The executive branch may issue rules, regulations, or guidance
implementing the legislature's legal framework for mediation, arbitration, and
collaborative governance.19
The executive branch may provide new agencies, institutions, or forums to
implement or oversee rule of law initiatives. It may use dialogue and deliberation
as part of transitional justice. For example, the Brazilian Ministry of Justice
created the Amnesty Commission to seek truth and reconciliation, although the
legislative branch had only authorized reparations.120
Similarly, the executive branch may enter into collaboration with civil society, stakeholders, and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to
avoid a breakdown in the rule of law.121 In Eastern Europe, the Project on Ethnic
relations brought together political leaders in Romania and Montenegro with representatives of majority and minority ethnic communities for high level dialogues
and problem-solving sessions to achieve consensus on a variety of issues, including the structure of minority education, autonomy in local government, and power-sharing in the legislature.122
C. StructuralChoices in the JudicialBranch
Courts are sensitive to structural choices. Authoritarian regimes can manipulate courts through a variety of techniques such as purging judges, changing the
structure and jurisdiction of the court, and intimidation.' 23 In authoritarian regimes, judicial independence is limited.124 In contrast, independent courts can
play an important role in democratization through decisions protecting civil and
political rights.125 Examples of rule of law initiatives in the judicial branch in118. Bingham, supra note 115, at 312.
119. See generally, e.g., the gateway website of the Federal Interagency ADR Working Group,
http://www.adr.gov (last accessed Mar. 22, 2011).
120. Memory and NationalReconciliation,supra note 91.
121. Allen H. Kassof, Taming the Beast: Interethnic Conflict andAccord in Postcommunist Europe,
in BUILDING PEACE: PRACTICAL REFLECTIONS FROM THE FIELD 17, 20-21, 27, 37 (Craig Zelizer &

Robert A. Rubinstein, cds., 2009).
122. Craig Zelizer & Robert A. Rubinstein, CreatingStructure and Capacityfor Peace, in BUILDING
PEACE, supranote 121, at 1, 7.
123. Tom Ginsburg in The Politics of Courts in Democratization,in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE
RULE OF LAW, supranote 17, at 175, 176, observed:
These formal and informal techniques are well known. Regimes can impact the courts through
controlling composition, such as by purging old members, appointing new ones and expanding or
contracting the size of courts. They can manipulate career incentives to encourage judicial conformity. They can also focus on the design of the judicial arena, manipulating jurisdiction and
creating special courts for categories of cases that are especially politically salient. They can pass
new laws to overturn errant judicial interpretations. And in extreme cases, regimes can intimidate
judges directly.
Id. Note that as previously discussed, Hitler used some of these techniques to limit the power of the
German Supreme Court. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
124. Ginsburg, supranote 17, at 177.
125. Id at 180. Ginsburg observed that:
[A] court decision raises the cost of repression and is a resource that can be used by activists to
rally supporters to their cause. The court decision legitimates regime opposition and raises the
costs of repression. A regime that arrests citizens after an unfavorable court decision will suffer
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clude local dispute resolution such as the Gacaca Courts in Rwanda,126 multi-door
courthouse projects,127 and other decentralized institutions to improve access to
justice.128 Initiatives also include private justice systems, such as commercial
arbitration and independent arbitrators in response to concerns over a lack of independence in the judiciary, as in the case of bilateral investment treaty arbitration
intended to protect private property from expropriation.129

D. StructuringChoices Across the Policy Continuum so that the Branches
of Government Reinforce Them
It is important to consider how interventions may require coordinated action
across the policy continuum. For example, transparency is a critical procedural
intervention in governance to help produce the rule of law.130 How would an intervention produce transparency? The legislative branch might enact a law to
require public access to government records. However, such access is not selfenforcing. The executive branch has to implement the law by providing access to
government records upon request or by providing disclosure through electronic or
hard copies of the requested documents. This requires both a mechanism or
process for implementation and a means of enforcing implementation. It might be
desirable to provide independent supervision of the executive branch to insure
implementation through monitoring by non-governmental organizations. It might
also be necessary to provide for review of the executive branch's implementation
of the transparency laws by the judicial branch.
Similarly, in post-conflict and post-crisis societies, returning refugees and
those dislocated by the conflict can find that their homes have been destroyed or
resettled; this can create a question of title in the property.' Parties may be able
to address these land and property disputes through designs including mechanical
or procedural bureaucratic approaches, unassisted negotiation, technical assisgreater reputational loss than it would before that decision. This is not to say that the court decision guarantees implementation - only that it can facilitate mobilization.
Id.
126. See, e.g., Phyllis E. Bernard, Begging for Justice? Or, Adaptive Jurisprudence? Initial Reflections on Mandatory ADR to Enforce Women's Rights in Rwanda, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 325
(2006); Phil Clark, Hybridity, Holism, and "Traditional" Justice: The Case of the Gacaca Courts in
Post-Genocide Rwanda, 39 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 765 (2007); Maya Goldstein-Bolocan, Rwandan
Gacaca: An Experiment in Transitional Justice, 2004 J. DisP. RESOL. 355 (2004).
127, E.g., University of St. Thomas International ADR Research project entitled "Investing Social
Capital: Exploring the Multi-Door Courthouse as a Catalyst to Maximize Latin American Dispute
Resolution
Systems,"
directed
by
Professor
Mariana
Hernandcz
Crespo,
http://courseweb.stthomas.edulmdhernandezc/ (last accessed 4/25/11); Frank Sander and Mariana
Hernandcz Crespo, A Dialogue Between Professors Frank Sander and Mariana Hernandez Crespo:
Exploring the Evolution ofthe Multi-Door Courthouse, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 665 (2008).
128. Moyer, supra note 93.
129. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the
Rule ofLaw, 19 PAC. McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEv. L.J. 337 (2007) and Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes ofInvestment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARv. INT'L L.J. 435 (2009).
130. See generally Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/ (last accessed Mar. 22,
2011).
131. Christopher Moore & Gary Brown, Designing Dispute Resolution Systems for Settling Land and
Property Disputes in Postconflict and Postcrisis Societies, in BUILDING PEACE, supra note 121, at 79,
79.
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tance, coaching, third party conciliation, facilitation, or mediation, and various
forms of arbitration.' 32 However, comprehensive designs may be more effective;' 33 and sometimes these designs must include legislative action to achieve
land reform.'13
South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) illustrates a systemic design that integrated the participation of all three branches of overnment
as well as civil society. It was the product of the legislative process. Its enabling statute defined the conditions of amnesty and applied those conditions to
crimes committed during a limited period.' 36 It also created a quasi-judicial institution, the TRC, and empowered it to hold public hearings.' 37 The TRC broadly
engaged the public in these hearings through committees, direct testimony, public
access, and broadcasts.' 38 It provided for truth as a precondition of reconciliation,
not simply for reparations upon demonstration of injury as in the case of Brazil.' 39
Its design was both substantive (conditions of amnesty) and procedural (transparency as a means of reconciliation). In the absence of amnesty, the executive and
judicial branches continued to have jurisdiction over prosecutions and appeals.140
The TRC is widely viewed as a successful DSD.141 It contributed to a peaceful
transition from apartheid to a democracy and the rule of law in South Africa.
E. Structural Choices Entailing Civil Society, CollaborativeGovernance,
andInformal Institutions
For governance designers to make progress toward the rule of law, they must
engage stakeholders and the general public. In an empirical study of transitions
from dictatorship to democracy; nonviolent civic forces, or people power, played
a key role in achieving freedom; there was comparatively little effect for top down
transitions led by elites; and cohesive nonviolent civic coalitions were the most
important factor contributing to a transition.' 42 Similarly, one stream of rule of
law research holds that formal institutions are necessary, but not sufficient, to
achieve the rule of law and that informal institutions, such as voluntary networks,
132. Id. at 82-86.
133. Id at 87-88,
134. Id. at 91-92.
135. See generally Truth and Reconciliation Commission, http://www.justice.gov.zaltrc/ (last acccssed Mar. 22, 2011).
136. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (S. Afr.), available at
http://wwwjusticc.gov.za/legislation/acts/1995-034.pdf (last accessed Mar. 22, 2011).
137. Id. See also James L. Gibson, Truth, Reconciliation, and the Creation of a Human Rights Culture in South Africa, 38 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 5 (2004).
138. See, e.g. Register of Reconciliation, http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/ror/index.htm (last accessed
Mar. 22, 2011). There are transcripts of amnesty hearings, and decisions on amnesty, available at
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/index.htm (last accessed Mar. 22, 2011).
139. Moyer, supra note 93, at 631.
140. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 § 21, available at
http://www.justicc.gov.zallcgislation/acts/1 995-034.pdf (last accessed Mar. 22, 2011).
141. See generally James L. Gibson, The Truth About Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa, 26
INTL. POL. SC. REV. 341 (2005), available at http:H/www.jstor.org/stable/30039021 (reporting the
results of a large scale empirical study finding that the TRC was viewed as largely successful).
142. See generally Adrian Karatnycky & Peter Ackerman, How Freedom is Won: From Civic Resis(2005),
available
at
Democracy,
FREEDOM
HOUsE
tance
to
Durable
http://www.freedomhouse.orgluploadstspecial-report/29.pdf (last accessed Mar. 22, 2011).
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are essential.143 Recent empirical work is focusing on informal self-regulating
networks in trade and the economy. For example, in Vietnam, the formal legal
system is weak, but private parties find ways to structure exchanges.'" Vietnamese farmers create their own informal trading system and engage in complex trading transactions including the provision of credit.
Rule of law initiatives not only include institution-building within and across
government, but also collaboration between governments, the public, and stakeholders. One model is to build local capacity through an NGO independent from
government, as in the case of Partners for Democratic Change.145 Its Slovakia
affiliate worked over a period of years to disseminate cooperative conflict management skills through training leaders from the NGO, local government, and
private sectors; training trainers to provide a multiplier effect; applying conflict
management processes such as mediation, facilitation, and consensus-building;
and promoting public policy supporting mediation.'" In Slovakia, Partners developed conciliation commissions to assist ethnic communities with conflict management and reconciliation.147
V. CONCLUSION: AFTER DESIGN, EVALUATION
To achieve the rule of law, designers may need to structure interventions
across the policy continuum as a whole in a way that causes the three branches of
government to reinforce the interventions. At each point on the policy continuum,
there are opportunities to engage the public and stakeholders, and to provide for
voice and participation. Designers should consider not only formal but informal
institutional arrangements in the context of social norms, history, and culture.
Dispute systems design also requires a pragmatic willingness to identify metrics
and indicators of success for the system and measure its performance in light of its
goals. Empirically evaluating design efforts and adjusting designs in response to
these results is a final and critical piece;14 8 it permits repeated democratic experimentalism over time. By adopting a systems perspective, a broad conception of
governance, and a commitment to continuous evaluation, it may be possible for us
to design governance to produce the rule of law.

143. Stephan Haggard ct al., The Rule of Law and Economic Development, I1. ANN. REV. POLl. SC.
205, 220 (2008). The authors observed that:
Key to the success of these self-governing informal frameworks are three core elements: the dependence of traders on reputation; the capacity of informal institutions to provide and re- lay information on transgressions among the network of participants; and the existence of a fully incontive-compatible and decentralized sanctions mechanism in the simple form of the refusal to
deal.
Id.
144. See Brian J.M. Quinn and Anh T.T. Vu, Farmers, Middlemen, and the New Rule of Law Movement, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 273, 319-22 (2010).
145. Beth Glick & Laina Reynolds Levy, The Institution as Innovator: Laying the Foundation for
Peaceful Change, in BUILDING PEACE, supra note 115, at 39, 39.
146. Id at 41,
147. Id at 45.
148. Jeffrey K. Staton, A Comment on the Rule of Law Unplugged, 59 EMORY L.J. 1495, 1512-13
(2010).
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